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TRAFFIC VICTIMS. Tort Law and Insurance. By Leon Green. Evanston,
Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 1958. Pp. 128. $4.
This provocative little book is based on the 1958 Rosenthal lectures,
given at Northwestern University School of Law. Though little is new in
this publication, for Professor Green and others have been writing and
talking about the automobile accident problem for many years, it succeeds
in putting the whole problem in perspective for the non-specialist in tort
law. Essentially the book's thesis seems to be this: Originally tort law was
based on a doctrine of strict liability keyed to the action of trespass; under
the impact of increasing commercial activity and industrialization, negligence law developed and protected infant business enterprise against
burdensome liability by relieving the defendant of all liability for unintended harms except those involving "fault," or blameworthiness of conduct; in the twentieth century an increasing concern for the individuals
ground beneath the mechanical juggernaut is leading to a revision of tort
law in the direction of strict rather than fault-based liability, so that the
user of machines must pay for the harm he does; as yet this tougher-minded
negligence law is too uncertain and complex to solve the problem of automobile accidents, even when accompanied by widespread automobile liability insurance; thus a legislative solution is needed. The solution Professor
Green proposes is compulsory motor vehicle comprehensive loss insurance,
which would compensate injured persons irrespective of fault.
The industrialization of society brought sweeping changes in the law,
for a legal system adapted to an agrarian, stationary, status-oriented society
is not suitable for the needs of an industrial, mobile, individualistic society.
Thus earlier law puts excessive emphasis on the values of the status quo.
Its property notions prevent change; its contract law is little developed.
By the nineteenth century, however, public attitudes called for significant
change. Protection of static property gave way to concern for enterprise;
property was fully protected only if it was property in use. As Hurst put
it in an earlier Rosenthal lecture, "We were concerned with protecting
private property chiefly for what it could do; as one looks at the facts
of cases and pays somewhat less attention to the sonorous language of judicial opinions, he is impressed that what we did in the name of vested
rights had less to do with protecting holdings than it had to do with protecting ventures. There is no key instance where vested rights doctrine
protected a simple rentier interest." 1
The law of torts, too, responded to the change in the environment.
Strict tort liability was consistent with the basic patterns of the older

1 HURST, LAW AND THE CoNDmONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED
STATES

24 (1956).
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society. "One must use his own so as not to injure another, and if he does
injure him he must show himself utterly without fault." But as enterprise
became more important than status quo, the tort of negligence developed.
The doctrines of negligence fitted the aggressive, enterprising, changing
nineteenth century milieu better than did the stricter liability of trespass,
for it relieved enterprise from excessive risk. The result was a doctrine
that required "fault" for tort liability; the underlying basis of liability
became a "moral" one. It is one of the merits of Green's book to point out
that the real basis for the new tort law was not "morality," but the needs
of infant enterprise, or if morality then the morality of the industrial
revolution. The change was coincident with increase in traffic on the highways; "horse and buggy" cases constituted the anvil on which the new law
was hammered out. If the old basis of liability had continued, the business
man would have put his fortune at risk whenever he went on the highway
with a load of merchandise. The new doctrine eliminated that potential
liability in the absence of "fault." Enterprise could not pay for the harm
it caused, charging it off in the price of its product, because (1) enterprise
was largely individual, and very modestly capitalized, so that a single large
damage suit might bankrupt- the entrepreneur, and (2) the insurance
devices for protecting him against this eventuality were far in the future.
Thus the law accommodated itself to the apparent needs and capacities
of social organization, and relieved the entrepreneur of certain adventitious
costs so that he did not have to take account of them in his pricing. Harms
that we would regard as a proper part of the cost of doing business were
thus left to lie where they fell. In a sense, the injured individual was sacrificed on the altar of collective need, i.e., the hapless individual subsidized a
supposedly dynamic and fearless enterprise.
One can recognize the need for this result at one stage in the evolution
of our society without approving it in principle. Indeed, in our modern
view, this subsidy collected from unwilling individuals was immoral. Most
of us today give at least lip service to the proposition that these "social"
costs of private enterprise should be brought into the cost accounting
process of the entrepreneur and passed on to the consumer through the
pricing mechanism-at least this is announced public policy in all the advanced capitalist nations.2 The merits of this change in social .practice have
long been obscured by the effective use of pejorative terms to describe it.
At least since Dicey3 it has been customary to talk of the nineteenth century
as an age of individualism; and to speak of the developments of the
twentieth century as collectivist. The development of administrative tri-

2 For a full discussion of this whole idea, see KAPP, THE SocIAL Cosrs OF PRIVATE
(1950).
3 DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN _LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND
DURING THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY (1905).
ENTERPRISE
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bunals has been decried as "Bureaucracy Triumphant,"4 and government
protection of hapless individuals against the machine as "The Road to
Serfdom."5 These developments may have their dangers, which it is not
the province of this book review to explore, but there is much merit in
Green's suggestion that the appellation "collectivist" is misused. For it was
in the nineteenth century that the injured individual was sacrificed to the
collective need-to the desire of society for more and cheaper goods, and
for successful enterprise, while it is in the twentieth century that the dignity
and worth of the individual is better recognized and protected. No longer
can the unemployed or injured workman be casually cast upon the industrial scrapheap and left to bear alone the accidental costs of the industrial machine.
This drastic change in social attitudes has produced elaborate schemes
of social insurance; it is also having its effect through a massive subterranean movement to alter the conformations of negligence law-to return
tort liability for injury back to a stricter form, not based on fault.
Two factors are important in causing this reversion. For one thing,
business itself has developed a sound method for converting risk into costa highly developed and enterprising insurance business will sell insurance
coverage protecting against almost any liability for harm done to others.
Even without insurance, the risk to enterprise of a stricter tort liability
would be less, for the enormous modern corporation can easily convert risk
into cost through self-insurance. Perhaps more important than the possibility of insurance, however, are the ravages of the motor car. This lethal
weapon, which some years since killed its millionth victim, poses a problem
of incredible proportions. A social problem so dramatic and pervasive calls
for drastic solutions, and even scholars generally unsympathetic to a departure from fault orientation for tort law may concede that the "sheer bulk of
the automobile accident problem is such that unusual measures are
suggested."6
Professor Green feels that "the courts are powerless to reconstruct a
rational process for general use." The elaboration of doctrine and the
general resistance of the litigation process to change make it likely that
the court will not solve the problem posed by the slaughter on the highways. Others would go farther and, adhering strictly to the received notions
of stare decisis, deny to the courts the right to make the change, even if
they could do so.
Many suggestions have been made for legislative solution of the problem. A compensation scheme akin to workmen's compensation would re-

(1931).
(1944).
6 Cooperrider, "A Comment on The Law of Torts," 56
(1958).
4 All.EN, BUREAUCRACY TRIUMPHANT

5 HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM

MICH.

L. REv. 1291 at 1302
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move the automobile problem from the sphere of negligence litigation,
recognizing the irrelevance of fault where fault is almost impossible to
assess. This scheme would not seek to redress wrong but to distribute
risk. The compensation proposal has been in the mill for several decades,
but despite repeated introduction in state legislatures, it is still untried
in the United States. Less drastic is compulsory insurance as a prerequisite
to automobile registration. Massachusetts adopted it thirty years ago, but
was alone until New York recently followed suit, after insurance company
opposition was weakened by intra-industry disagreement. Financial or
safety responsibility laws are almost universal; these laws compel unsuccessful defendants or persons who have been involved in accidents to buy
insurance. They also induce most other persons to do so.
If what is desired is to assure persons injured on the highways that
they will not have to bear alone the accidental costs of motorized transport, the difficulty with all these proposals, save only the compulsory compensation system, is that insurance remains tied to the unwieldy lawsuit
for negligence. Of course the pervasiveness of insurance does make it likely
that the defendant can pay a judgment without serious harm to him;
insurance thus creates a solid basis for reconstruction, if the courts wish,
of a stricter form of tort liability. But Green thinks such a reconstruction is
beyond their powers.
Even if the courts could reconstruct tort law, there is much to be said
for legislative intervention, for the solution can then be limited to automobile accidents. Where "fault" can be more readily ascertained, there
may be strong arguments for preservation of a fault-based system.7
Professor Green proposes compulsory motor vehicle comprehensive
loss insurance, as an incident to the licensing of a motor vehicle. It differs
from the compulsory insurance proposal mentioned above in insuring the
loss of the injured person rather than the liability of the tort-feasor. This
makes the proposal for compulsory insurance more rational and self-consistent, for the reason for compelling insurance is the protection of injured
third persons. It makes little sense, then, to filter that protection through a
fault screen. Compulsory loss insurance would protect the injured person
directly, without the intervention of negligence doctrines, though it would
remain a court-administered system. Professor Ehrenzweig's similar proposal of "full-aid" insurance would also eliminate the fault screen.8
It is beyond the purpose of this book review to examine the proposal
in more detail. That is the province of a more ambitious literary undertaking. Perhaps it is sufficient to say, by way of conclusion, that Professor
Green has added a useful and provocative piece to the growing literature
which is concerned with reconstructing the field of tort law to serve the
7 See, e.g., Cooperrider, "A Comment on The Law of Torts," 56 MICH. L. REv. 1291
(1958).
8 EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1954).
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needs of twentieth century society. It is to be hoped that much more
attention will be given to this problem, not only by scholars, but also
(and more important) by legislators and their advisers.
Spencer L. Kimball,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

